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author | Jim Meyering <meyering@redhat.com> | 2012-04-23 22:06:35 +0200 |
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committer | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2012-10-02 04:03:47 +0200 |
commit | 61d4147ea2d58c9d129a084be13ccec6ae18b4d5 (patch) | |
tree | 13d8bf24328eda853c94b1a59dea78af44e4cbe4 /filters/syntax-highlighting.sh | |
parent | 055e092a330098f6b9177266facf43029dbe1883 (diff) | |
download | cgit-61d4147ea2d58c9d129a084be13ccec6ae18b4d5.tar.gz cgit-61d4147ea2d58c9d129a084be13ccec6ae18b4d5.tar.bz2 cgit-61d4147ea2d58c9d129a084be13ccec6ae18b4d5.zip |
do not write outside heap buffer
* parsing.c (substr): Handle tail < head.
This started when I noticed some cgit segfaults on savannah.gnu.org.
Finding the offending URL/commit and then constructing a stand-alone
reproducer were far more time-consuming than writing the actual patch.
The problem arises with a commit like this, in which the user name
part of the "Author" field is empty:
$ git log -1
commit 6f3f41d73393278f3ede68a2cb1e7a2a23fa3421
Author: <T at h.or>
Date: Mon Apr 23 22:29:16 2012 +0200
Here's what happens:
(this is due to buf=malloc(0); strncpy (buf, head, -1);
where "head" may point to plenty of attacker-specified non-NUL bytes,
so we can overwrite a zero-length heap buffer with arbitrary data)
Invalid write of size 1
at 0x4A09361: strncpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:463)
by 0x408977: substr (parsing.c:61)
by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73)
by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153)
by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171)
by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181)
by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690)
by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191)
by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56)
by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120)
by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544)
by 0x404078: cache_process (cache.c:322)
Address 0x4c718d0 is 0 bytes after a block of size 0 alloc'd
at 0x4A0884D: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263)
by 0x455C85: xmalloc (wrapper.c:35)
by 0x40894C: substr (parsing.c:60)
by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73)
by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153)
by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171)
by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181)
by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690)
by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191)
by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56)
by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120)
by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544)
Invalid write of size 1
at 0x4A09400: strncpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:463)
by 0x408977: substr (parsing.c:61)
by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73)
by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153)
by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171)
by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181)
by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690)
by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191)
by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56)
by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120)
by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544)
by 0x404078: cache_process (cache.c:322)
Address 0x4c7192b is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd
Invalid write of size 1
at 0x4A0940E: strncpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:463)
by 0x408977: substr (parsing.c:61)
by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73)
by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153)
by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171)
by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181)
by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690)
by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191)
by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56)
by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120)
by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544)
by 0x404078: cache_process (cache.c:322)
Address 0x4c7192d is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd
Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV)
Access not within mapped region at address 0x502F000
at 0x4A09400: strncpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:463)
by 0x408977: substr (parsing.c:61)
by 0x4089EF: parse_user (parsing.c:73)
by 0x408D10: cgit_parse_commit (parsing.c:153)
by 0x40A540: cgit_mk_refinfo (shared.c:171)
by 0x40A581: cgit_refs_cb (shared.c:181)
by 0x43DEB3: do_for_each_ref (refs.c:690)
by 0x41075E: cgit_print_branches (ui-refs.c:191)
by 0x416EF2: cgit_print_summary (ui-summary.c:56)
by 0x40780A: summary_fn (cmd.c:120)
by 0x40667A: process_request (cgit.c:544)
by 0x404078: cache_process (cache.c:322)
This happens when tail - head == -1 here:
(parsing.c)
char *substr(const char *head, const char *tail)
{
char *buf;
buf = xmalloc(tail - head + 1);
strncpy(buf, head, tail - head);
buf[tail - head] = '\0';
return buf;
}
char *parse_user(char *t, char **name, char **email, unsigned long *date)
{
char *p = t;
int mode = 1;
while (p && *p) {
if (mode == 1 && *p == '<') {
*name = substr(t, p - 1);
t = p;
mode++;
} else if (mode == 1 && *p == '\n') {
The fix is to handle the case of (tail < head) before calling xmalloc,
thus avoiding passing an invalid value to xmalloc.
And here's the reproducer:
It was tricky to reproduce, because git prohibits use of an empty "name"
in a commit ID. To construct the offending commit, I had to resort to
using "git hash-object".
git init -q foo &&
( cd foo &&
echo a > j && git add . && git ci -q --author='au <T at h.or>' -m. . &&
h=$(git cat-file commit HEAD|sed 's/au //' \
|git hash-object -t commit -w --stdin) &&
git co -q -b test $h &&
git br -q -D master &&
git br -q -m test master)
git clone -q --bare foo foo.git
cat <<EOF > in
repo.url=foo.git
repo.path=foo.git
EOF
CGIT_CONFIG=in QUERY_STRING=url=foo.git valgrind ./cgit
The valgrind output is what you see above.
AFAICS, this is not exploitable thanks (ironically) to the use of strncpy.
Since that -1 translates to SIZE_MAX and this is strncpy, not only does it
copy whatever is in "head" (up to first NUL), but it also writes
SIZE_MAX - strlen(head) NUL bytes into the destination buffer, and that
latter is guaranteed to evoke a segfault. Since cgit is single-threaded,
AFAICS, there is no way that the buffer clobbering can be turned into
an exploit.
Diffstat (limited to 'filters/syntax-highlighting.sh')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions